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ABSTRACT
Russia today presents potentially lucrative business opportunities and markets for any
company interested in expanding internationally. Together with the opportunities and potential
profits, however, Russia also presents formidable challenges and risks to any Western or American
company considering doing business there. The purposes of this thesis are: to explain how
Russia’s unique and tortured history has impacted the business culture of modern Russia; to
describe the primary business risks that any Western company entering Russia will face; and to
offer recommendations to any Western company considering doing business there.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The impact of national history and culture on doing business in Euro-Asia, Russia in
particular, is widely recognized among American managers. Many of them find that the significant
differences between Russian and Western cultures make the functioning of multinational
companies in Russia more difficult. This paper will examine the impact of historical and cultural
traditions on the business norms and behaviors among Russian business people. Moreover, this
paper will provide guidance and broad recommendations to Western companies planning to
successfully enter the emerging Russian market.
This thesis is divided into three sections. The first section presents a historical overview.
This overview demonstrate that Russia’s long and tragic history has influenced the development
of a “survival mentality” and certain patterns of business behavior. The second section describes
the obstacles that Western companies can expect to face when entering Russian marketplace.
Finally, the third section provides business recommendations and approaches to successfully
operate in this unique part of the world.
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2. RUSSIA THROUGHOUT HISTORY
2.1. The Russian Empire
The vast territory known as Russia today has been known historically by different names,
including Rus, Kievlan Rus, Tsardom of Muscovy and the Russian Empire. Until 1917, Russia
was a monarchy with rulers known as tsars. Russia’s history is long and tragic. Russians have
suffered at the hands of invaders, but also at the hands of their own rulers (Wilson & Donaldson,
1995). Most Russians know their history well and proudly tell others about their motherland’s
victories and sacrifices. A deep understanding of Russian history is essential for Western partners
to understand and navigate the governmental bureaucracy, frequently changing laws and evolving
social structure of the country. Western business ventures in Russia are advised to understand this
history and its influence on the challenges of engaging in business in Russia’s emerging
marketplace.
From the eleventh to the fourteenth century, Russia was relatively undeveloped and
disengaged from European innovations. Though it was considered a European country, Russia did
not have access to navigable seas, nor did it have abundant productive soils, a long agricultural
growth season or a large population of workers per square mile. Therefore, Russia had more
obstacles to economic growth than many of its European counterparts.

Western innovations

usually reached Russia after a lag of several centuries. In agriculture, the three-field system,
widespread in Europe by the ninth century, became the dominant agricultural form in Russia only
at the end of the seventeenth century.
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In addition to slow agricultural innovation, government and private institutions also
developed more slowly than Russia’s European counterparts. As a result, many of Russia’s biggest
cities (such as Novgorod, Pskov, and Kiev) were not major centers of commerce until the twelfth
century.
In the thirteenth century, Russia began strengthening economic and cultural interaction
with the rest of Europe. Then, the Mongol Empire, with a brutality rarely witnessed in history,
invaded Russia and destroyed major cities, including Moscow, Ryazan, Kiev, and Kolomna. After
three years of resistance, all Russian states were forced to submit to Mongol rule and tax burden,
and became a part of the Golden Horde Empire. This lasted until the fifteenth century. Large tribute
payments to Mongols drained money from the country, destroyed many commercial centers and
delayed economic growth in Russia. The invasion also diminished Russia’s position on the
international stage. Weakened by the Mongol attacks, Russia lost control of the important Dvina
River trade route and the Western territories in the west of Lithuania and Sweden which led to the
erosion of Russia’s international power. (MacKenzie, 1999).
The Mongol invasion of Russia also influenced the language and the form of government.
Even though Russia never completely lost its European heritage and influence, the political and
social systems of Russia were significantly affected by the Mongol invasion. In some ways, Russia
became a more Asiatic nation, particularly in terms of governmental policy; but its deep Christian
roots helped maintain a strong cultural link with Europe (Hosking, 2001).
After the bloody and burdensome Mongol period, it took several decades for the economy
to begin to rebound. Indeed, during the next four centuries, even during periods of substantial
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economic growth, there were always substantial lags in socioeconomic development in Russia
compared to other European countries. Economic and cultural growth in Russia would have
proceeded more rapidly if peace had prevailed in the country for a prolonged period. As Petr
Stolipin, one of Russia’s prime-ministers, stated: “Give Russia twenty years of external and
internal peace and it will change beyond recognition” (Yanov, 2012, p.5). Unfortunately, that
never happened. Between 1700 and 1940 Russia fought in 34 wars and in 392 battles. Every war
resulted in millions of people being killed and the destruction of numerous Russian cities.
In the seventeenth century, during the reign of Peter the Great, Russia became one of the
leading European powers. After winning access to the Baltic Sea, Peter the Great founded one of
the most beautiful European cities, Saint Petersburg, and moved the Russian capital from Moscow
to St. Petersburg. Peter also promoted education and the Enlightment. He replaced some of the
traditionalist and medieval social and political systems with systems that were modern,
westernized, and scientific. Foreign know-how and technology were prized. Despite the distaste
most Russians felt for “heathen foreigners,” the Russian government employed numerous foreign
engineers, craftsmen, military advisors and others at high salaries and with good career
opportunities in Russia. This was an effective strategy to transfer knowledge from the highly
trained foreign employees to eager Russian apprentices (Wilson, Donaldson, 1995).
Peter’s main goal was to get Russia involved in the diplomatic and military affairs of
modern Europe. Catherine the Great followed Peter and continued these efforts, but with a focus
on exposing Russia to Western educational methods. During the reigns of Peter and Catherine,
western advisors and business people arrived in Russia in increasing numbers. Many young
Russians were sent abroad to study and bring back their knowledge to serve their country.
4

By the eighteenth century much was changing in Russia. French was used more than
Russian in upper-class households. As Russians learned how to read French, German, and English,
they became familiar with the ideas of Western philosophers. Catherine the Great’s reign, often
called the Catherinian Era, is considered the Golden Age of Russian Nobility. It is quite clear that
the reforms of the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries had a long, positive impact on
Russian society.
In the eighteenth century, after Napoleon’s unsuccessful invasion campaign, the Russian
Empire had the third largest population in the world. Russia extended from the Arctic Ocean in
the north to the Black Sea in the south, and from the Baltic Sea in the west to the Pacific Ocean in
the east. Demographically, it remained heavily rural with low productivity on large estates worked
by serfs, who were peasants irrevocably tied to their landlords, until they were freed by Alexander
the Second in 1861. Despite its progress, however, Russia embarked on modern economic growth
two generations after most European countries. Hence, the weaknesses found in domestic
entrepreneurship in Russia are directly related to the country’s history, and hindered Russia’s early
development (Gaidar, 2012).
In the nineteenth century, the government realized that the financial and military strength
of the country could only develop with more proactive economic initiatives. Proactive economic
policies of those years included protectionism in terms of high tariffs which led to high consumer
prices for goods and services within the country.
The government also faced risk factors that increased the probability of the tsarist
regime’s collapse. In the rural areas peasant dissatisfaction was rising due to the unfair distribution
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of land which eventually led to the upheavals of 1905-1906. Moreover, Western European political
organizations and civil societies were evolving. Western European governments guaranteed
individual and political rights and expanded suffrage (Gaidar, 2012). The European model
undermined the Russian model of an enduring absolute monarchy in the eyes of the educated
population (Mitchell, 1998). At that time, socialist ideas became popular and had a strong influence
on people who had no opportunity to take an active part in public politics. The tsarist regime,
however, was inflexible; it could not implement in an orderly manner the deep reforms that were
necessary (Gaidar, 2012).
2.2. “Iron Curtain”, The Era of Bolsheviks
November, 7, 1917 is a date deeply engraved in history. It marks the death of the old
tsarist regime and its replacement by the Bolsheviks. In March 1917, revolution broke out on the
streets of Saint Petersburg and Tsar Nicholai Romanov, the last tsar of Russia, was forced to
abdicate the throne. That November, the radical socialist Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin, seized
power and established the world’s first communist state. But for Lenin, Nicholai was still a major
problem. The tsar, appointed by God, had many loyal followers. Many Russians considered
Romanov, while alive, to be the legitimate ruler of Russia. Therefore, Lenin decided to get rid of
the tsar and his family.
After a secret meeting in Ekaterinburg, where the tsar’s family was held, the Bolsheviks
decided to sentence them to death. Late on the night of July 16, Nicholai, Alexandra, their five
children and four servants were awakened and ordered to dress quickly and go down to the
basement of the house where they were being held (Rosefielde, 2007). They were told to arrange
in two rows for a picture to be taken to quell rumors that they had escaped. Suddenly several armed
6

gunmen burst into the room and shot the servants and the entire imperial family. Those who were
still breathing were stabbed to death (Kushnirsky, 1982). The remains of Nicholai, Alexandra and
three of their children were found and positively identified in a forest near Ekaterinburg in 1991.
Alexey and Anastasia, the other two Romanov’s children, were believed to have survived the
execution. The execution of tsar Nicholai’s family was the end of the Romanov’s three-century
reign in Russia.
The reason the Bolsheviks resorted to such extreme measures was to ensure total
compliance by the people to the will of the government. The Bolshevik ideology led to a radically
different form of government than previously experienced under the tsars. Soviet Bolsheviks
ideology was based on Marxist social theory. According to Marx, a socialist society was the first
step to communism. The term “transition society” was used to emphasize the temporal differences
between the socialist and communist stages. Socialism requires only a short period of rapid growth
in order to achieve Communism, supposedly, the highest form of productivity and morality.
The Marxist social theory of communism describes collective labor as a fundamental
social and moral value. All social relations should be based on collective labor and high social
consciousness for the mutual good of society. The essential condition for moral progress to the
Bolsheviks was a complete elimination of the market economy, status differences, and private
property rights with communal labor being at the top of mutual good. Collective enrichment was
deemed superior to any individual activity and personal motivation. Communist ideology claimed
that a man working for himself was an egoist, a disgrace, someone who could not live in a
communist society (Wilson & Donaldson, 1995).

7

Communist philosophy was the major influence on ethics in Russia. For over 60 years,
managers operated in a centrally planned economy where virtually no judgments regarding ethical
behavior were considered. The government mandated who, what, where, when and why as to how
all business practices were conducted. For all the communist years, Russian business men and
women had no significant moral discretion to exercise other than to “obey” or “disobey”.
Accordingly, Russia suffers from an undeveloped moral or ethical code for commerce.
In 1962 the communist ideology was distilled into a 12-point moral code serving as a
guide for loyal communists. The code, however, failed to control the behavior of the communist
elite, who were among the first to violate it; they justified their actions by rationalizing that the
end result would justify the means. The regime created no incentives to work hard or take personal
responsibility for one’s actions. Power and privileges were the exclusive rights of those who were
loyal to the party; therefore, party loyalty was more important than the 12-point moral code.
Lack of freedom, lack of opportunity, centralized dictatorship, and oppression of
individual expression created a passive population that placed little value on individual
accomplishment or entrepreneurial activities. Laws and edicts were dictated by the Communist
authorities with little opportunity for impartial resolution dispute, and no opportunity for a trial by
jury (Puffer & McCarthy, 1995). A plethora of meaningless and contradictory laws governing
business, and no independent judiciary, made the laws easy to circumvent. Widespread violations
of these laws left them virtually impotent to regulate business; the priority for business remained
focused on the achievement of goals set by the Communist government.
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One of the most devastating consequences of Communism in the Soviet Union was the
total destruction of all competition for power. Virtually every institution was owned and run
strictly by the state, and no single business, farm, church, newspaper, or voluntary organization
competed during the reign of communism. By the end of the 1980s it was evident that the
communist model had failed. A flawed ideology with corrupt and immoral leaders, a lack of
personal realization, a defunct economy and empty grocery store shelves led to the inevitable
conclusion that communism is dead.
2.3. Capitalism Arrives
In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev started the process of Perestroika, referred to as a complete
rebuilding of economic and political systems. The goal of Perestroika was to bring the Soviet
economy up to par with Western European countries by introducing reforms. The most significant
of Gorbachev’s reforms in the economic sector allowed foreigners to invest in the Soviet Union
through joint ventures (Gaidar, 2012). In the political sector, Gorbachev democratized the system
by launching Glasnost, which literally means openness. Glasnost encouraged inclusion of the
populace in the political process, and allowed freedom of expression. The initiative that had the
most far-reaching effects was Gorbachev’s decision to abandon Soviet control of the communist
nations of Eastern Europe. He declared that all nations should be free to choose their own course
without outside interference. In 1989, Communist regimes fell in Poland, Hungary, East Germany,
Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania. Gorbachev’s reforms partially decentralized the
economy, although price control remained, as did the government control over means of
production.
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Hard-line communists attempted to remove Gorbachev from power in 1991 by staging a
coup. The revolt failed due to the efforts of Boris Yeltsin, who emerged as the country’s most
powerful political figure. On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned from the presidency,
handing over control to Yeltsin. One day later, on December 26, 1991, Yeltsin and other reformers
formally dissolved the Soviet Union. That day the Soviet Union flag was lowered from the Kremlin
for the last time and replaced with the Russian Flag.
Yeltsin announced an economic reform program that would become known as “shock
therapy” (Pirani, 2010). The main elements of his plan included abolishing price controls, making
the ruble convertible at market rates, liberalizing trade, and privatizing state property. Yeltsin
appointed Egor Gaidar and Anatolii Chubais, known as the founders of market institutions in
Russia, to push through the “shock therapy” reforms.
Yeltsin’s market-oriented “shock therapy” had some negative effects, including a
decrease in real wages, the rise of corruption, and rapid inflation produced by price liberalization.
Privatization was a major enabling factor in the rise of organized crime, known as “Mafia” and
corruption.

Mafia had the ability and financial resources to acquire state companies and

enterprises. In 1994, a report for President Yeltsin stated that 80 percent of private banks and
businesses had to pay 10 to 20 percent of their revenues to organized crime coalitions (Kotz &
Weir, 2007: 178). The Mafia presence in the society was very visible and violent. Gang-style
executions were common; 120 bank employees, including 15 directors, were killed and 780 arson
attacks were made on banks in 1993 alone (Grealy, 2010).
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Although the radical changes of “shock therapy” were not as successful as the reformers
had hoped, in the long run they generated more important and wide-spread positive results. In the
economic context, Russia began to emerge as a strong economic power. By eliminating high tariffs
and quantitative restrictions the government encouraged international trade and foreign investment
in Russian economy. Many multinational Western companies, with their superior marketing and
financial power, entered Russian markets, thereby creating incentives for local companies to be
more competitive and produce more efficiently. The ruble, the domestic currency of Russia, was
made fully convertible - that is, anyone holding them would be free to exchange them (Grealy,
2010). By August 1996, monthly inflation dropped from the January 1992 peak of 245 percent to
close to zero. Exports were rising-from about $54 billion in 1992 to about $88 billion in 1996, and
Russia ran a $28 billion trade surplus in 1996 (Russian Economic Trends, 1997). Perhaps most
impressive, “shock therapy” also succeeded in calming the fears of those who worried that
communism would rise again. The “shock therapy” approach effectively sealed the coffin on the
communist past.
Clearly, “shock therapy” was radical, but in the long term, it was the most beneficial
approach the government could enact.
2.4. From Yeltsin to Putin
On 31 December of 1999 Boris Yeltsin announced his resignation, leaving the presidency
in the hands of his successor-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Putin, a former KGB agent, was the
President of Russia from 2000 to 2008. Then, from 2008 to 2012, he served as the Prime Minister
and was reelected as President in 2012. Although Russia was formally headed by Dmitriy
Medvedev (President from May 2008 to 2012), Vladimir Putin was the most influential leader
11

during that time period. During Putin’s first premiership and presidency (1999-2000), Russia’s
economy was rapidly growing, real incomes rose by a factor of 2.5, while real wages more than
tripled (Sakwa, 2007). Gross Domestic Product (GDP) grew by about 68 percent from 2000 to
2008. Putin’s first presidency was marked by a rise in living standards; average wages rose more
than fivefold (Pirani, 2010). The high-profile improvement in living standards is one of the primary
reasons why (in electoral terms) Putin has been one of the most popular presidents in recent history.
Many economists and politicians identify Putin’s past in the KGB as the key to his
successful achievements. While his background in the main security agency of the Soviet Union
played a significant role, the 2000s commodities boom, increases in world oil prices, and the
progressive reforms of Egor Gaidar were probably the major catalysts for the economic progress
of the period.
Russia has always been one of the largest energy producing countries in the world and is
heavily dependent on the export of oil and natural gas for revenue. Natural resources account for
65-70 percent of total exports and account for half of the federal budget. The Russian government
relies on the export of oil and natural gas to an unhealthy degree. It fails to address other economic
weaknesses, specifically the poor state of agriculture, and the lack of machine-building and
processing industries. Economists dispute whether Russia is prone to what they call the “natural
resource curse,” a situation in which abundant natural resources produce short-term benefits, such
as big export revenues during periods of skyrocketing prices, but potentially damages long-term
economic development (Pirani, 2010).
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Although the oil boom improved living standards overall in Russia, it also widened the
gap between the rich (oligarchs) and the poor, leaving Russia as one of the world’s leaders in
inequality in income and property distribution. The State Statistics Service’s Funds Coefficient,
an indicator that measures the richest against the poorest segments of the population, indicates that
the rich continue to grow richer while the poor remain more or less in the same position (Balmforth,
2013). From 1995 to 2011, the coefficient was steadily increasing. Furthermore, from 2009 to
2013, the capital of Russia (Moscow) held the title as the billionaire capital of the world. Eightyfour of the world’s richest people, whose combined wealth is over $366 billion, called the Russian
capital their home in 2013. This tiny group of multi-billionaires control up to 40 percent of the
nation’s wealth, and these statistics may understate the problem because the rich are notorious for
taking their wealth out of the country or keeping their savings out of the banks and therefore off
the radar. This problem has no simple solutions. Economists point to the need for more political
and market competition, enforcement of property rights, the rule of law, systemic change in labor
market institutions and stronger social protection for the ones in need (Parfitt, 2011). In the
meantime, analysts say nothing has been done to narrow the gap that continues to grow.
The political system in Russia during the periods of Putin’s presidencies is often called
Putinism. From the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was viewed as one of the
most important test countries for a transition to democracy. During Boris Yeltsin’s presidency
(1991-1999), most Western and American academic specialists regarded Russia as a democracy
and believed that Russia was in an early stage of transition, with some imperfections that did not
negate the fundamentally democratic character of the political regime (Evans, 2010). However,
within a few years after Vladimir Putin’s presidency began, many analysts began to refer to the
13

political system as authoritarian because former military and security officers brought into
government (called “Siloviki”) took control of much of the political and economic power (Hahn,
2004). Stephen Whitefield noted that, under Putin, there is an “increasing consensus among
scholars, journalists, and policy-makers in the West” that the Russian political regime has moved
“significantly off a democratic pathway,” (Whitefield, 2009, p.93). Considering both the
undemocratic features and the components of democratic pluralism remaining in Russia, it is fair
to call the existing political system in Russia “semi-authoritarian”.
In a semi-authoritarian political regime, democratic rights such as freedom of speech,
freedom to organize, and freedom of assembly are no longer recognized. In respect of freedom of
speech, Putin’s rule began with the campaign to bring the national television stations under state
control. Doing so ensured that only sanitized news reached most Russian households, thereby
safeguarding Putin’s electoral majority (Pirani, 2010). The widespread emergence of the Internet
has made the situation better for those seeking alternative sources of news. On the other hand,
freedom of the press has also been undermined by closing down or taking control of some of the
most outspoken newspapers, such as Segodnya and Kommersant.
Russia’s record of murdered journalists is worse than that of any country except Iraq and
Algeria; between 1993 and 2008, 81 journalists died doing their job; 40 more were killed under
suspicious circumstances and 13 disappeared (Pirani, 2010). In October 2006, international
attention focused on the murder of Anna Politkovskaya. Politkovskaya was a human rights activist
and, the heroic writer for Novaya Gazeta about the war in Chechnya. After a five-year trial, three
men were sentenced to prison, two of them for life. Nevertheless, it remains unclear who ordered
or paid for the murder of Anna Politkovskaya and several other prominent investigative journalists.
14

3. RISKS IN THE BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
Although Russia is struggling to evolve into democracy with guaranteed freedoms for its
citizens, the emerging Russian market is still enticing to both American and European businesses.
However, the unstable political and economic environment creates uncertainties for companies
considering Russia as a market for their goods and services. Yet, the size of the market and the
potential for international expansion are tempting.
Of all of the challenges facing Russia, perhaps none is more complex than reducing
corruption and strengthening the rule of law. Corruption has often been identified as a major source
of problems. Corruption is perceived to be considerably greater in Russia than in Poland, Brazil,
India, and China, on par with Ukraine, but less than in Venezuela or Uzbekistan (Aslund, Guriev
& Kuchins, 2010). Given Russia’s highly educated populace and relative wealth, its level of
corruption is surprising. One explanation is that while corruption and weak support for the rule of
law impose significant costs on society at large, they also produce concentrated benefits for
powerful constituencies within Russia. It is critical to recognize the underlying political nature of
the problem. Each sweetheart tax deal to companies owned by relatives of powerful state officials,
each government contract directed to the major political party supporters (United Russia) rather
than to the best qualified firm, and each call from a governor to a judge to decide a case in a
supporter’s favor is enabled by political capital that incumbents are loathe to abandon (Aslund,
Guriev & Kuchins, 2010).
It seems a herculean task to combat corruption in a country where, apparently, no
institution or agency is free from it. As a result, it has become an accepted view that the Russian
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economy is non-transparent - that is, it is an economy where the “rules of the game” are not easily
understood (Ledeneva, 2001). The “rules of the game” can be understood, however, if one knows
and takes into account the so-called unspoken rules and unwritten policies. There is a common
saying in Russia: “V Rossii zakon - vse ravno, chto dishlo, kuda povernul , tuda i vishlo” (one law
for the rich and another for the poor). It is not that the components of the rule of law lack
transparency; rather, the ability of the law to function coherently has been subverted by a powerful
set of informal practices that have evolved in Russia. Tax evasion is one of the many examples
that illustrate how unspoken rules operate. There are many informal and commonly known ways
of reducing tax liability and evading taxes; this is detrimental to the efficient functioning of the
economy (Ledeneva, 2001). On the other hand, “saved” taxes are oftentimes used to reinvest in
the economy.
A popular folk saying, “Do not have a hundred rubles, but have a hundred friends,”
illustrates another striking example of unspoken rules - the phenomena of “blat” and informal
systems of networking. The word “blat” is practically impossible to directly translate into English.
It is commonly referred to as the use of personal networks and informal contacts to obtain goods
and services in short supply and to find a way around formal procedures (Ledeneva, 1998). “Blat”
networks include personal, occupational, and educational ties in the allocation of resources. Blat
is widely used in the spheres of state education and employment. Most of the prestigious and wellpaid jobs are only obtained by acquaintance, even where the market trends are supposed to take
over (Ledeneva, 1998). American and other Western companies working in Russia put a lot of
effort into resisting blat employment, but often with no success. Some enterprising Western
companies, however, manage to turn blat relations to their advantage. One of the chocolate
16

factories in Samara provides a good example. Since being privatized by Nestle, it has become one
of the most sought out companies to work for. One has to have a connection to obtain a job there
- either a relative working there or an influential person already employed. One of the main goals
of the company was to make the factory somewhat similar to a family-run business; therefore, the
top management implemented a policy of hiring only by recommendation. They created a waiting
list of all relatives of their workers, with their credentials, who were interested in employment with
the company. When a vacancy arose, the most qualified candidates from the list were invited for
an interview. As a result, employment by blat was rationalized and institutionalized into a
somewhat formal and recognized procedure. The informal and blat networks ensure trust and
reduce hiring risks. Therefore, blat networks are indispensable in a variety of contexts in today’s
Russia. Understanding the constructive effects of blat can help Western companies overcome its
negative implications. The fundamental issue, however, remains how to deal with a society in
which loyalty to one’s connections means more than loyalty to the state and where unwritten codes
and social conventions dominate the law (Ledeneva, 1998).
Despite Russia’s uncertainty and instability in many aspects of the economy, it still
represents attractive business opportunities for Western companies. A survey among 42 U.S.based companies conducted by Puffer (1996) revealed some interesting findings. The chosen
companies ranged from small businesses to Fortune 100 corporations. Four of them were just
preparing to enter the Russian marketplace. The 38 firms that had already established themselves
in Russia entered the market in the following ways: with a local partner (16), directly (10), through
a broker or facilitator (8), or with a Western (or American) joint venture (4). Despite the inherent
riskiness of foreign business activities in Russia, only four respondents evaluated the success of
17

their firms as poor. The majority rated their companies’ success as either “good” or “very good”,
while eight rated it as only “fair” and three reported achieving excellent results. As these overall
evaluations illustrate, business ventures in Russia have been relatively favorable for most
companies.
This does not mean, however, that there are no obstacles or risks. To get an overall
assessment of the risks, the survey asked two general questions. First, respondents were asked to
rate the uncertainty of the business environment in Russia on a 4-point scale. The 19 respondents
judged the business environment as being highly uncertain and risky, while 21 evaluated the
conditions to be somewhat uncertain and moderately risky. Only two described the environment
as having either low or little risk. “Only put in what you can afford to lose. Decide up front what
you want- profits, market share, and the like,” advised Erich Zarnfaller, Senior International
Treasury Analyst at EG&G, Inc., the Wellesley, Massachusetts provider of environmental
management services and manufacturer of radiation and security devices. Added Kathy Crecelius,
a Vice-President at BayBank in Boston: “The former USSR presents … great risk. However, for
those with ethnic and linguistic ties to the C.I.S. countries, with solid business experience and
capital to invest- and risk, there are now opportunities” (Puffer, 1996, p.217).
The second general question was related to the role of the government of Russia and its
attitude toward American companies entering the marketplace. The 12 firms rated the host
government as being supportive of their efforts, and 17 evaluated it as neutral. Furthermore, six
respondents were in their first year of business activities in Russia; therefore, they had limited
exposure to the government officials. Seven firms did find the government to be a major obstacle
to doing business. One of them was Intertech International Corporation, a Boston-based firm
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whose Austrian subsidiary was involved in a joint venture to install air conditioning systems in
new constructions. One of the managers, Richard Saint-Amant, provided insight into the complex
web of bureaucracy existing in the former Soviet Union. First, the Russian Embassy in Washington
D.C. refused to provide work visas based on a letter from the Russian partner. The Russian
Embassy in Vienna, home of Intertech’s joint venture partner, however, did find the letter
sufficient to provide work visas. Nevertheless, in an attempt to send air cargo to the Black Sea via
Moscow, Intertech lost six weeks waiting for bureaucrats in Moscow to “locate” the shipment.
To help understand the extent of the major risks and obstacles that companies face doing
business in Russia, the respondents were asked to rate nine specific risks on a 5-point scale from
“no risk” to “extreme risk.” The identified areas of greatest risk were political instability (3.6),
lack of infrastructure (3.6), and the lack of laws protecting business interests (3.5). Difficulties in
obtaining supplies and raw materials were also rated as a serious risk (3.2). Other risks, considered
to be less serious, included undeveloped financial markets and institutions (2.8), lack of suitably
experienced partners (2.7), difficulty repatriating profits (2.5), work force issues (2.5), and
corruption and bribery (2.1). We will discuss each of these issues separately.
3.1. Political instability
Given Russia’s frequent change of political regimes, political instability was noted by
many respondents as an important source of risk. Western and American companies are simply
afraid to invest their money into an unstable political environment. The political environment can
affect the economic environment, thereby impacting companies’ profit margins and bottom line.
Nevertheless, Peter Hemingway, Program Director of Russia Operations at Polaroid Corporation
in Cambridge, Massachusetts believes that it pays to be patient: “We still have hopes Russia will
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emerge as a major trading partner in the international environment. The current problem is lack of
focus on where they are going” (Puffer, 1996, p.218). Despite the political risks, the Russian
market is full of potential and foreign companies willing to take risks can exploit the potential
found there.
3.2. Lack of infrastructure
Most of the physical infrastructure is highly undeveloped in Russia. The transportation
system is inadequate for conducting business efficiently. “Lack of distribution,” insisted Henry
Quinlan, President of BosMosco, a Boston-based company marketing food, sporting and medical
goods in Russia, “presented a tremendous opportunity to create our own distribution system. The
entire retail and wholesale network is rising from nothing” (Puffer, 1996, p.219). Recently,
however, this issue is less of a major problem because the physical infrastructure has been
developing rapidly. According to the Business Monitor’s forecast (2014), infrastructure
development in Russia is the most important component in order to unlock its economic growth.
Furthermore, their data illustrates that over the last 10 years the construction sector has been
playing a far more significant role in the overall economic output in the emerging Russian
economy. Between 2004 and 2007, the construction sector’s contribution to gross domestic
product (GDP) was approximately 5.4-5.5%. Moreover, preparations for the 2018 World Cup
prompted the government to increase its spending on new infrastructure projects, including new
transport investment and commercial construction.
3.3. Lack of laws governing and protecting business interests
Arguably, one of the most important barriers for entry into Russia is the lack of laws or
weak laws governing and protecting businesses. Furthermore, many of the existing laws are vague
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and can be interpreted in multiple ways. As previously discussed, laws tend to be applied
selectively as local authorities see fit. According to another study conducted by Radaev (2002),
over 70 percent of entrepreneurs in Russia experienced broken contracts. Consequently, weak
institutions combined with vague, inconsistently applied laws result in the chronically weak rule
of law in Russia. This sense of lawlessness affects domestic and international companies alike. In
another survey of 50 major foreign companies investing in Russia (McCarthy, 2001), 24 of them
estimated their annual losses from intellectual property violations to be at least one million dollars.
Moreover, there are some laws and regulations from the Soviet Union era that are still in
force. As a result, it is sometimes unclear and quite confusing which regulations apply in a specific
case. In fact, “No one really knows which laws and regulations are implemented and observed,
although it is clear that many are not implemented at all, or only partially” (OECD, 2005, p. 5).
Given the current situation, “Entrepreneurs fear bureaucrats more than criminals” (Smolchenko,
2005, p. 1). It is not surprising that all these factors combined form barriers for Western companies
attempting to learn Russian laws and prepare action plans.
3.4. Difficulty obtaining supplies and raw materials
This issue generated the most disagreement among the people polled in the survey
conducted by Puffer (1996). The majority of respondents claimed that obtaining supplies and raw
materials was not a problem. These respondents represented service firms involved in banking,
consulting, and sales and distribution activities that did not rely on Russian suppliers. A near equal
number of respondents said the issue presented “some,” “much,” or “extreme” risk. These
respondents mentioned problems associated with obtaining equipment and raw materials for
manufacturing.
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3.5. Undeveloped financial markets and institutions
With little money available from the few existing lending institutions in the former Soviet
Union, obtaining financing for business ventures has proved to be difficult. American companies
are reluctant to back businesses in such an unstable environment. As BayBank’s Kathy Crecelius
claimed, “US banks will not be committing their capital for a long time, and rightly so” (Puffer,
1996, p. 219).
3.6. Lack of suitably experienced Russian partners
In Puffer’s survey (1996) most of the respondents rated this obstacle on the less risky end
of the spectrum. It reflects that some companies entered the marketplace directly, without any
assistance from their Russian counterparts or third party brokers. Other companies who had
established business relationships with their Russian partners expressed satisfaction with them.
This group included companies such as Baird Corporation, which had been approached for a joint
venture by a firm in St. Petersburg. Overall, relationships initiated by the Russian side have become
fairly common.
Some of the issues associated with finding appropriate partners in Russia included
filtering the opportunities that were presented, and ensuring that those making claims and promises
are capable of backing them up. Ralph Sherman, Corporate Counsel at Innovatech International,
Inc., a stainless steel manufacturer in Lexington, Massachusetts, added “filtering opportunities” to
the list and rated it among the most extreme risks (Puffer, 1996). Ernst & Young, a prominent
international consulting and accounting firm, also reported to have issues in screening potential
partners and opportunities on behalf of several clients.
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3.7. Difficulty repatriating profits
Repatriation of profits did not rank among the highest risks. Some companies, including
Nyrpo Corporation and Intertech, stated that it did not represent any problems for them. Nyrpo, a
Massachusetts based company that manufactures molded plastic products through a joint venture
in Moscow, earned their profits in the local currency-rubles. Conversely, Intertech’s representative
stated: “If somebody really wants to buy, they will find a way to pay in hard currency” (Puffer, p.
220). Nevertheless, some of the firms indicated that repatriation of profits was one of the major
concerns while conducting business in Russia. Given the fact that the emerging economy of Russia
has been growing at a rapid rate over the last few years, it is not surprising that the government
takes initiatives to encourage Western companies to reinvest their revenues rather than sending
them back to the home country.
3.8. Work force issues
According to Puffer’s survey (Puffer, 1996), work force issues did not present a lot of
risks according to the respondents. A few, however, ranked this problem as having “much” or
“extreme” risks. To further understand this important issue, I referred to a Meirovich and Reichel
(2000) study regarding American and Russian employees. According to it, there is a cross-cultural
conflict that demonstrates the differences in the norms and practices of the two groups. For
example, Russians do not always support the basic American concept that “the customer is always
right”. Another workforce problem that American managers face is the workers’ mentality formed
under the system of the total centralization. They are looking for instructions from the boss in
every situation even when they can be in charge of the decision-making process. Clearly, they are
not used to delegation of responsibilities, decentralized decision-making, and initiatives of middle
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managers. Therefore, cultural values and norms of the majority of Russian workers still adhere to
the socialist economy ideology.
Another study conducted by Beekun et al. (2003) explored how U.S. and Russian
employees differ in evaluating what constitutes ethical behavior and what does not. Respondents
were given scenarios and were asked to make their decisions based on ethical judgements. The
study concluded that U.S. employees have stricter guidelines when it comes to assessing ethics.
Furthermore, the researchers discovered that ethical assessments varied widely with different
scenarios. There was a significant correlation between scenario type and national cultures.
American stance towards ethics is clear; the U.S. passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act more than a decade ago, and the U.S. Department of Justice has been actively pursuing
violators. Russia’s tumultuous history and unique culture, however, have contributed to less
certainty among Russian employees about what constitutes ethical business behavior.
Moreover, unlike their American counterparts, Russian managers and employees have
very vague ideas about business honesty, bribery, proprietary information, etc. Such differences
in approach create misunderstandings. A Western company entering the Russian marketplace may
find it advantageous to hire local employees, but the potential risks involved due to different ethical
standards must be taken into consideration. As previously discussed, the significant differences in
cultural norms, values and ethics cannot be underestimated.
3.9. Corruption and Bribery
Surprisingly, in the survey by Puffer (1996) most companies had not been exposed to
corruption and bribery. In a more recent interview (Hsu, 2005), however, the executives of
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international companies doing business in Russian ranked this issue among the most important
ones. Furthermore, this study showed that networks between companies and government
bureaucrats seem to be indispensable to survive and grow in the Russian marketplace. When
starting a business, some companies were given a choice of the “slow way in” without payoffs or
“fast track”, with the associated corrupt payments (Karhunen & Ledyaeva, 2012). Thus, investors
from non-corrupt countries view corruption and bribery as one of the key barriers of entry into the
Russian market; moreover, it is a huge obstacle to gain and sustain a competitive advantage.
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4. THE FLAVOR OF SUCCESS AND FAILURE IN RUSSIA
4.1. An improving marketplace
Clearly, there are considerable obstacles that Western companies face doing business in
Russia. Lately, however, Russia has been making significant progress toward improving its
investment climate, as shown by the most current data from The Doing Business report. The Doing
Business report evaluates over 180 countries on 10 criteria, such as ease of opening a new business,
ease of securing a construction permit, access to the distribution infrastructure, registration of
ownership rights, ease of securing loans, protection of investors' rights, tax payments, and a
country's role in international trade. According to the 2013 annual report, Russia has significantly
improved its business climate by climbing 20 positions to the 92nd place. Two years earlier, in
2011, Russia climbed four places, and it improved its position in the 2012 rating from 120th to
112th place (Interfax, 2013). Hence, Russia has been becoming a more business-friendly country.
Moreover, Western companies are willing to pursue opportunities in the face of significant risks
in this ever-changing and potentially productive market.
According to a 2012 report from the non-profit International Research and Exchanges
Board and the U.S.-Russia Foundation, several major US-based companies have a large presence
in the country. PepsiCo was the first American company to enter the Russian market in 1974
(Rocco, 2014). Over the last 40 years, the company has created more than 30,000 jobs and invested
more than $3 billion in Russia. General Motors and Ford manufacture cars in Russia, while
Caterpillar and John Deere have several plants that build their respective equipment. Operations
in Russia produced $1.7 billion in revenues in 2014 for John Deere. Even though that is less than
five percent of John Deere’s total revenues, it is still significant. John Deere is represented by 70
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dealers and has two factories and two offices in Russia. IBM, Microsoft and Apple also have a
large presence in the country. Mars Inc. entered the Russian market in 1991 and it has recently
built its second chocolate factory. Procter & Gamble opened its first Russian unit in 1991, and it
has become one of the largest players in the consumer goods segment. Boeing and Chevron have
a large presence in the market also. Most of these companies faced some of the obstacles discussed
earlier. Nevertheless, they managed to overcome them and become major players in the Russian
economy.
4.2. Coca-Cola: A Model for Success
Coca-Cola is among the most successful companies in Russia. Coca-Cola entered Russia
after the collapse of the socialist regime. It began by selling Fanta prior to the introduction of CocaCola in 1985. When Coca-Cola was introduced to Russia, the company had only a small presence
in comparison to PepsiCo, which by that time had established a strong position in the bottled drink
industry. The situation soon changed due to an innovative strategy initiated by Coca-Cola
management in 1990 (Rolfe & Woodward, 1997). At that time Russian economic and political
situations were uncertain. Soft drinks companies still reported to the State Agricultural Industry
Committee, a vestige of the socialist past, and, therefore, a large investment carried a large
potential risk for the company. Nevertheless, Coca-Cola’s executives made the decision to expand
rapidly and widely in Russia. They gave the company’s representatives in Russia a mandate to
establish an entire and complete system of production, marketing and distribution centers
throughout Russia all within six months.
One of the most critical tasks for top management was to establish open channels of
communication with government officials and to persuade them that the production, marketing
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and distribution systems would indeed work and would generate millions of dollars in revenues
over the long term. The next obstacle they faced was finding the land to build the first factory. It
turned out to be a longer process than they had initially anticipated. However, in building the first
Coca-Cola factory in Russia Coca-Cola truly became a pioneer. In 1991, they were the first
American company to lease land from any government in Russia. They had to explain to the
Russians what a lease was. This process took longer in Saint Petersburg; where it took over 30
months just to get all the necessary approval documents from the local government. Furthermore,
St. Petersburg could not provide the basic infrastructure for the first plant. Coca-Cola had to make
a deal with government authorities, whereby it received tax rebates that covered capital costs for
infrastructure development.
Innovation and flexibility were hallmarks of the company’s investment strategy (Rolfe &
Woodward, 1997). Coca-Cola expanded in Russia through different entry models, such as joint
ventures, building new plants in place of old, refurbished ones. In addition to direct investments
by Coca-Cola, its other investment partners have invested in Russia as well, including the Inchcape
and Leventis Groups (conglomerates from the United Kingdom), and EFES (Turkey). These
companies helped Coca-Cola expand its facilities beyond Moscow and St. Petersburg.
When Coca-Cola decided to locate in Russia its strategy implementation began by
building the basic infrastructure for soft drink production (home office, plants, and distribution
channels). In the first phase, the major challenge was to be able to meet customer demand. In the
second phase the strategy focused on developing an extensive distribution network and
establishing a supplier base that would ensure high quality while containing costs.
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Finding reliable and flexible suppliers for raw materials and components was critical to
Coca-Cola. According to Michael O’Neil (Rolfe & Woodward, 1997, p. 3), the Coca-Cola
manager in Russia, a key strategy to overcome the internal barriers that hindered other investors,
was to get their production and distribution infrastructure established locally as quickly as possible.
This was not always been easy; simple supplies like glass bottles initially were not up to CocaCola’s standards. Finding a supplier to make Coca-Cola’s icon contour bottle was a challenge, but
eventually, a local supplier was secured.
4.3. Lessons learned from Coca-Cola’s experience
Why was Coca-Cola successful while others we not? The key success factors were their
short-term advantages and long-term strategies. In the short term, Coca-Cola received a substantial
two-year tax exemption from the Russian government which held down costs while Coca-Cola’s
strategies were being formulated and implemented. One of Coca-Cola’s key strategies that they
implemented as soon as possible was to localize production. Whereas other American companies,
such as IBM, set up an assembly plant that remained vulnerable to import duties and tariffs, CocaCola decided to localize its supply chain. Having flexible local suppliers was the key to reducing
the risks of increased taxes and import tariffs.
To avoid corruption problems, Coca-Cola carefully chose its business partners and
worked only with ones who are not engaged in any questionable practices. Furthermore, its
employees were trained according to the company’s code of conduct which is known to be stricter
than the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
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The incredible success of Coca-Cola is evident to anyone in Russia today. The company
employs over 3500 local workers, including prominent managers who form the core leadership for
the company’s future growth and expansion. Coca-Cola has always paid close attention to hiring
and retaining top talent. In part because of its highly trained personnel, it has quickly achieved
market leadership in Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Coca-Cola’s experience in Russia highlights the strategies and tactics that improve the
chances for success for a company making a direct investment in Russia. It was crucial for CocaCola to establish a market-oriented and customer-driven supply chain in a country that previously
lived under a command system with production quotas. Coca-Cola recognized that Russians knew
relatively little about marketing, production efficiency, and consistently high quality. On this
score, Coca-Cola was a key market player in the transition to capitalism.
To summarize, Coca-Cola proceeded deliberately but quickly to overcome significant
obstacles when it entered the Russian market. Its key success tactics included localizing
production, establishing reliable supply chains, finding the best possible labor, and working closely
with federal and local authorities on taxes, land and other potential problems. Most importantly,
Coca-Cola operated with integrity in all circumstances.
4.4. Other successful American companies in Russia
Another US-based company, ice cream maker Ben and Jerry’s, has also been extremely
successful in the Russian marketplace. The company, known for its proactive charity practices,
first considered opening a store in Russia in 1987 during President Mikhail Gorbachev’s
perestroika reforms. Three years before opening its first store, the company formed a joint venture
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to open an ice cream factory and parlor in Petrozavodsk, 175 miles from St. Petersburg. “We
quickly learned that to do business here, you cannot just have Plan A and Plan B. You will need
Plan C, D, E, F, and G,” said Greg Quinn, general director of Ben and Jerry’s Russian operation
(Knobel, 1993). “You have to expect things not to go right and then be flexible to take advantage
of it.” It took several years to find reliable suppliers of ingredients and locations for its caféfactories concept. The first retail store was opened in July of 1992. According to Quinn, the major
problems they encountered were undeveloped infrastructure and the lengthy process of finding
dependable supply sources. Despite the challenges, their hard work is paying off. The business is
turning a profit; furthermore, their rapid growth has allowed them to expand into sales of prepackaged pints and even multi-gallon tubs of ice cream in Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Ben and Jerry’s, like most other foreign companies in Russia, pays in rubles for the
ingredients, equipment, and employees’ salaries. The profits are wired back home. They use the
simple mechanism of buying dollars at Russian banks and then wiring them to the U.S. Therefore,
repatriating profits was not among the obstacles that they faced doing business in Russia. Other
barriers they faced, however, according to Ben and Jerry’s executives, are a lack of basic business
laws and finding partners you can trust. One piece of advice they give is to have an incredible
amount of patience because it takes much longer than anticipated to start making a profit.
Caterpillar is also among U.S. companies with a significant presence in the Russian
market. Caterpillar’s history in Russia began in May 1913 when Holt Caterpillar exhibited at the
St. Petersburg Auto Show. The Auto Show was set up to celebrate the 300th anniversary of the
dynasty of the Romanovs and Holt Caterpillar won all first-prize gold medals during the contest.
Since then, Caterpillar equipment has been an inevitable component of the Russian industrial
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landscape. According to CEO Doug Oberhelman, Caterpillar’s presence in Russia today is larger
than ever, with 700 employees and five offices in Russia and Kazakhstan, and a fully-owned
Caterpillar Greenfield facility in Tosno, a small town near St. Petersburg. Moreover, Caterpillar’s
20 dealers employ approximately 5,400 people who are responsible for delivering equipment and
services to the most distant parts of the country. There are approximately 27,000 Caterpillar
machines and 14,000 units of power systems equipment in Russia today. The Group President, Stu
Levenick, claimed that their success in the Euro-Asian market would not be possible without the
reputation of the best lifetime value. He emphasized the importance of the long-term customeroriented business activities that ultimately enabled them to gain a substantial market share. The
company has been making large investments in this growing market and intends to continue doing
so.
Another American company, Marco, on the other hand, has not been as successful as Ben
and Jerry’s or Caterpillar. Marco was started in 1991 by a group of private investors from St. Louis
and Kansas City who saw a big potential in exporting Russian lumber. According to Bartow Shaw,
one of the key investors, they wanted to help bring Russia back into the mainstream of the world
economy (Knobel, 1993). Karelia, a Russian region stretching along the Finnish border, had an
abundance of lush forests of pine and birch, with one lake for every five residents. At first, the
local government seemed supportive. It even undertook substantial steps to encourage foreign
investment. However, the local authorities were particularly sensitive about industries involving
natural resources. Because Russian laws favor joint ventures - and give them tax exemptions and
favorable export quotas - Marco began a search for partners. The search was challenging. Indeed,
potential candidates bargained so hard that Marco’s top management eventually decided to not to
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form a joint venture but remain solely a U.S.-owned company. As a U.S.-owned company,
however, Marco could not get permission from government officials to export some of their
products, such as cut lumber boards. They have compensated by moving into products that they
can get the right to export, but Marco continues to face significant and frustrating challenges.
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5. RECOMMENDATIONS
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, any Western company considering entering
the Russian marketplace should realize that it is moving into a unique environment that has risks
not necessarily found in other markets. These risks cannot be avoided, but by rigorous analysis of
the marketplace and adopting appropriate strategies and plans, the risks can be reduced. The
following recommendations are presented to assist any Western companies considering doing
business in Russia in facing the challenges and risks they will experience.
5.1. Do your homework and determine whether the Russian market is a good fit
for your company given the differences in culture and business ethics
Because companies are often attracted by the unusual opportunities and huge potential
profits available in Russia, they frequently underestimate the so-called liability of foreignness
(Rothaermel, 2013). This liability of foreignness includes the costs of doing business across
national borders in an unfamiliar cultural and economic environment. For the reasons discussed
above in this paper, any company considering entering the Russian marketplace should first
consider whether that market is a good fit for the company given the cultural, workforce,
infrastructure and legal differences they will encounter. It is far better for a company to decide up
front that Russia is not a good fit rather than to reach that conclusion after several years of failed
operations and the expenditure of considerable capital.

5.2. Plan your action before you enter the marketplace
Even if a company determines that Russia can be a good fit, it is critical that the company
develop appropriate strategies and implementation plans (with alternate plans also ready to be
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implemented) to achieve their objectives. The strategies should take into account: (i) actual or
potential political instability; (ii) a lack of infrastructure or inadequate infrastructure; (iii) vague
or inadequate laws and legal system; a dispute resolution mechanism such as arbitration should be
considered in all contracts; (iv) availability of supplies and raw materials; (v) underdeveloped
financial markets and institutions; (vi) possible lack of suitably experienced Russian partners for
the business; (vii) a plan for repatriating profits earned in Russia; (viii) work force issues – how
you will acquire, train and retain a capable workforce, including managers; (ix) how the company
will avoid or deal with issues of corruption and bribery, keeping in mind the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act or its equivalent in other Western countries; and (x) any other issues unique to the
particular business the company is in.

5.3. Be ready to invest more capital and time than anticipated
There is a significant cost of doing business in Russia, and the required investment is not
only for equipment. Recruiting and retaining top talent will require substantial amount of financial
resources and time. Given that the workforce issues are among the top obstacles when operating
in Russia, it is not surprising that extensive training and customized training programs will be
advantageous, particularly in the service industries which are generally known to be labor
intensive.
The research also suggests that the entire process of entering the marketplace in any given
industry usually takes longer than anticipated due to the bureaucratic structure. Every decision has
to be approved by an appropriate state authority which usually takes a considerable amount of
time.
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5.4. Spend significant time developing relationships with those with
power and influence
“Greasing the wheels” prior to entering Russian market is critical in order to establish
amicable relationships with authorities and those who are in charge of the decision-making
process. As previously discussed, formal and informal networks play an important role in
conducting business in Russia. It would be helpful to establish a reliable network to ensure
collaborative partnership while conducting business in Russia. The folk saying “It is not what you
know, it is who you know” particularly holds true for Russians.

5.5. Send the right people to Russia
It is especially important to select carefully the expatriates to make sure they have not
only their professional expertise, but also communication skills, a willingness to go “the extra
mile”, and the ability to teach and learn from others. The goal is to send people who have the
necessary talent to execute a business strategy and are capable of adjusting to the host country’s
cultural standards, and who can educate locals about American core competencies and procedures.
The research indicates that in some cases American managers sent to Russia to introduce new
organizational culture simply vanish into the ocean of resistance (Puffer, 1996). Others are
indifferent and do not even try to change anything. They perform their operational functions, but
they do not educate Russian employees to work in compliance with a company’s standards. As
one of the expatriates explicitly expressed it: “I am here to do my job, not to teach others to do
theirs. I am not getting paid for that.” (Puffer, 1996, p. 245). Clearly, not many experienced
business managers are willing to relocate to Russia; therefore, companies’ executives tend to send
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younger managers who often do not yet have appropriate skills and experience to introduce a new
business culture and management style in Russia. Nevertheless, the research suggests that by
providing language and cultural training for Russian employees, companies managed to increase
organizational trust and to motivate and retain local competent employees (Koveshnikov, 2012).
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6. CONCLUSION
Despite the opportunities Russia presents to a company looking for a significant new
market and huge potential profits in the long run, Russia also presents formidable challenges and
risks to any Western or American company considering doing business in Russia. Russia’s unique
and sometimes tragic history has influenced the business environment and the ethical standards of
the workforce. When that is combined with sub-par infrastructure, weak adherence to the rule of
law and inadequate legal protections, and potential shortages of adequate supplies and raw
materials, among other challenges, any Western or American company must carefully weigh
whether the challenges and risks are worth the potential rewards. What is clear, however, is that
some companies, such as Coca-Cola, have successfully navigated all the challenges and have
reaped the rewards that are available to a successful company in Russia. Moreover, Coca-Cola
has achieved success without compromising its ethical standards, which means that other
companies can do the same. However, any company wishing to join the successful Western and
American companies doing business in Russia must have plenty of capital and lots of patience. If
those companies consider the risks described in this paper and follow the recommendations
provided above they will reduce the risks they face and enhance the chances of a successful entry
into the Russian marketplace.
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